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Pedestrians are commonly engaged in other activities while walking. The current
study assesses (1) whether pedestrians are sufficiently aware of their surroundings to
successfully negotiate obstacles in a city, and (2) whether various common walking
practices affect awareness of obstacles and, or, avoidance behavior. To this end, an
obstacle, i.e., a signboard was placed on a pavement in the city centre of Utrecht,
the Netherlands. The behavioral measure consisted of the distance to the signboard
before pedestrians moved to avoid it. After passing, participants were interviewed to
obtain thought samples, self-reported route familiarity, a confirmation of secondary task
engagement, and to assess awareness through recall and recognition of the signboard
and its text. In this study 234 pedestrians participated. More than half of the participants
(53.8%) was unaware of the signboard, still none of them had bumped into it. Mind
wandering, being engaged in secondary tasks such as talking with a companion or
using a mobile phone, and being familiar with a route, did not affect awareness nor
avoidance behavior. In conclusion, despite being very common there was no evidence
that walking without awareness necessarily results in risk. The absence of awareness
does not imply any absence of cognitive and perceptual processing. Pedestrians are still
capable of successfully avoiding obstacles in their path, even in visually more challenging
environments such as a city centre. It is argued that this is because walking consists of
highly automated, skilled behavior.
Keywords: pedestrian behavior, walking, awareness, obstacle avoidance, secondary task engagement, route
familiarity, mind wandering, automaticity
INTRODUCTION
Walking is a ubiquitous mode of getting around in everyday life. In fact, every journey comprises
an element of walking: many of these walking trips are part of journeys consisting of at least one
other transport modality, so-called multi-modal journeys (Sauter et al., 2016). In this way walking
is incorporated in people’s everyday transport routines. A recent case study in Prague showed that
daily walking routines – such as the walk from home to the public transport station and the walk
from the car park to the workplace and back – covered, on average, 85.4% of people’s daily walking
activity (Sobková and Cˇertický, 2018).
Acts repeatedly practiced, become skilled behavior that can be performed without much
cognitive deliberation (Rasmussen, 1983). Continuing this line of reasoning to the ubiquitous act
of walking would imply that walking may in fact be performed largely automatically. As such,
performing the act of walking as an automated behavior would require little to no attention. This
idea is corroborated by Middleton (2009). She argued that walking is a mode of transport to clear
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the head, to think of other things instead of maintaining a
100% focus on traffic, a cognitive mode, also described as mind
wandering (Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). This separation
between body and mind suggests a bodily disengagement. This
disengagement was also identified by Wunderlich (2008) and
described as a state in which the human body is engaged in
performing the act of walking while the mind is not. Contrary
to Middleton (2009), Wunderlich (2008) reported on bodily
disengagement as a characteristic of walking practices such
as walking while listening to an audio player, walking while
talking on a mobile phone, and walking while eating. It appears
that being involved in other activities while walking is in fact
quite common. Kim (2015) recorded that 74% of pedestrians
walking to and from transit stations were engaged in at least one
other activity than walking, including (window) shopping, and
conversing with others. All these studies have in common, that
attention appears to be directed elsewhere than on the walking
practice itself.
The suspected automaticity for walking may result in mind
wandering and engagement in secondary tasks, which in turn
might direct attention away from the act of walking itself.
Another walking practice that might increase automaticity and
decrease the need to direct attention toward walking, is the
preference to walk along familiar routes. Of all trips undertaken
by foot, most walking is done along frequented routes (Mucelli
Rezende Oliveira et al., 2016). In other words, most walking is
done along routes with which pedestrians are highly familiar.
From car driving studies, it is known that increased route
familiarity results in increased automaticity and decreased
attention for the road (e.g., Martens and Fox, 2007; Charlton and
Starkey, 2011, 2013, 2018a; Harms and Brookhuis, 2016; Harms
et al., 2018). Largely unknown is whether the same applies for
walking. A study that touches upon effects of route familiarity
on walking is from Degen and Rose (2012). In their walk-along
study, they noticed that repetitive use of the same area appeared
to make people less sensitive to their direct surroundings. This
was aptly described by of one of their participants who remarked
“we are so used to the town, we don’t really sort of pay
much attention.”
Taking the above into account, it appears that pedestrians
display a general lack of attention for walking. Whether decreased
attention for walking poses a road safety issue can be questioned.
It depends, among other things, on whether it influences
perceptual awareness and our ability to safely navigate through an
environment. Although attention and awareness are dissociable,
attention may indeed influence awareness (Block et al., 2014).
In traffic, awareness is generally understood as a prerequisite to
understand where we are, in which direction to move and how
to negotiate obstacles in order to safely arrive at our destination
(Endsley, 1995). Moreover, many road safety experts believe that
maintaining a sufficient level of awareness about the environment
is regarded of utmost importance for road safety. In recent years,
under the influence of various neuroscientific laboratory studies,
the scientific concept of awareness has evolved considerably. By
now, it is understood that awareness – which is subjective by
nature, and as such is defined as an explicit perceptual report
throughout this article (similar to e.g., Sandberg et al., 2010;
Spering and Carrasco, 2015) – comes in degrees, varying from
no awareness at all, to a full conscious experience and perceptual
representation of a stimulus (e.g., Sandberg et al., 2010; Block
et al., 2014; Fazekas and Overgaard, 2018; Lamme, 2018). It has
been postulated that attentional mechanisms are able to modulate
the degree of awareness (Fazekas and Overgaard, 2018). Although
the exact degrees of awareness and how they are constituted may
still be under debate, awareness can roughly be distinguished
between rich, fully detailed reports and reports of degraded
conscious experiences, or representations (e.g., Anzulewicz and
Wierzchon, 2018; Fazekas and Overgaard, 2018). The latter is
also referred to as partial awareness (Kouider et al., 2010; Fazekas
and Overgaard, 2018). For example, someone may be under
the impression that a visual stimulus contains letters without
being able to report on the letters themselves (Kouider et al.,
2010). In both cases, people are able to – albeit partially – report
on their awareness regarding a specific stimulus. Perceptual
awareness, however, will not be achieved for all stimuli while
the stimulus may still influence behavior. This may be the case
when visual processing has stopped or has been disrupted at
a stage before perceptual awareness has been acquired. During
the early stages of neurological visual processing (the so-called
“feedforward sweep,” Lamme, 2003, 2018) features of an image
are extracted while processing is still unconscious. Yet, the
stimulus may already evoke a motor response – hence guide
behavior – while the person in question is still unable to report
on this stimulus (e.g., Lamme, 2003, 2018; van Gaal and Lamme,
2012). Typically feedforward processing is followed by recurrent
processing. When the extent of recurrent processing is sufficient,
awareness may arise. Although it is currently still controversial
whether recurrent processing is conscious or unconscious, a
general agreement appears to exist that during this stage of visual
processing visual stimuli may still be unattended, inaccessible or
not reported on. Hence, disruptions in processing may lead to
conditions such as change blindness, inattentional blindness, or
the attentional blink (for a review see Lamme, 2018). Participants
who act on a stimulus without being able to report on it,
might be regarded as “acting without awareness.” In traffic
psychology, cases are also known in which participants adapted
their behavior to stimuli such as speed limit and route instruction
signs, while unable to report about these stimuli (Fisher, 1992;
Harms et al., 2018).
The question that needs to be addressed is whether pedestrians
are at risk when not attending the environment while walking.
Especially in stimulus-rich areas such as city centers. Hence,
this study focusses on (a) whether pedestrians are sufficiently
aware of their surroundings to successfully negotiate obstacles
in a city and (b) how common walking practices such as
secondary task engagement, mind wandering, and taking familiar
routes affect (degrees of) perceptual awareness. In order to
better understand awareness while walking in a city, the current
research design was adapted from a study by Hyman et al.
(2014). They placed a signboard on a campus pathway in
order to study inattentional blindness for obstacles that guided
behavior. Although no one walked into the signboard, it was
concluded that mobile phone users were less likely to be aware
that they had passed a signboard (63.0%) than individuals not
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using electronic equipment (89.1%). Awareness was considered
as a dichotomous construct based solely on the recall questions
whether one had passed any obstacles on the pathway; whether
they had passed a signboard; and whether they remembered what
was on the signboard. Although participants obtained credits
for both full and partial responses for the last question, these
questions leave little room for more degraded awareness. As a
result of degraded awareness some participants may hold only
very vague experiences, which they might not share with the
observer (Overgaard and Sandberg, 2012). As such, regarding
awareness as dichotomous may result in less people being labeled
as “aware” of the signboard. To address this, we aimed to increase
exhaustiveness of our measure of awareness by measuring both
recall as well as recognition. Thus, providing participants with the




In the city centre of Utrecht, the Netherlands, a signboard was
placed on a pavement (see Figure 1). Using an observational
approach – analogous to Hyman et al. (2014) – pedestrians were
observed passing the signboard. When approaching, the distance
to the signboard until pedestrians started moving to avoid it
was measured. After passing, they were questioned whether
they recalled or recognized the signboard. These measures were
used to assess perceptual awareness, ranging from no awareness
whatsoever to a rich conscious experience or representation of
the signboard. Additionally, pedestrians were asked questions
about their familiarity with the area, their thoughts and their
engagement in any secondary tasks while walking. The study
had been approved by the Ethical Committee of the Department
of Psychology of the University of Groningen and by the City
Council of Utrecht.
FIGURE 1 | The signboard reads “Welcome to St.-Jacobsstreet” (in Dutch:
“Welkom in de St.-Jacobsstraat”). One observer was positioned on the
pavement across the road (not visible in the picture) while the other was
located adjacent to the first lamp post visible in the picture.
Materials
The 0.6 m × 1.09 m (width × height) sign was placed near
the edge of the pavement where people tended to walk, facing
the signboard, as shown in Figure 1. On the vertical side of
the kerb, discrete markers indicated the distance of 1.5, 5, and
10 m before the signboard. When walking on the pavement these
markers were not visible. The message on the signboard read
“Welcome to St.-Jacobsstreet” (in Dutch: “Welkom in de St.-
Jacobsstraat”), which concerned the actual name of the street
where the experiment took place. This neutral, inconsequential
message was selected from a separate pilot study among 59
participants. They were shown pictures of a signboard in a similar
street containing various messages and rated the remarkability
of said messages in their context. The message rated as least
remarkable was used in the real-life study.
Procedure
Pedestrians who would need to adjust their walking trajectory
to avoid the signboard when approaching the marked area
preceding the signboard were observed. When walking in a pair
or a group, the observers selected the pedestrian walking closest
to the signboard. If the pavement became overly crowded or if an
aberrant object was situated within or near the research area, data
sampling was stopped temporarily.
Firstly, the observers noted pedestrians’ gender-by-
appearance and whether the pedestrian walked alone, in a
pair or a group. The observers did not include pedestrians who
did not meet the physical inclusion criteria, which are described
in more detail under section “Participants.” Secondly, one
observer – discretely positioned across the road – recorded at
what point pedestrians moved to avoid the signboard. After each
pedestrian had passed the signboard, the other observer – located
adjacent to a nearby lamp post (see Figure 1) – approached them
to obtain permission to ask a few questions. Only pedestrians
who agreed and who provided informed consent, participated
in this study. Any data collected on those who did not agree was
discarded. Following a structured interview format, participants
were sequentially questioned about their route familiarity;
thoughts; overt secondary tasks; recall of objects they had
passed; and, if the signboard had not been mentioned yet,
recall and, if necessary, recognition specifically targeting the
signboard. In the interview, participants were questioned about
their familiarity with the area, by showing them a 10-point
scale sheet. Next, they were asked if something had been on
their mind before being approached by the observer and if
so, if they could share their thought (free to the method used
by Burdett et al., 2018). The observer then sought to confirm
the behavior observed when the pedestrian approached the
signboard, such as texting or doing nothing. Subsequently,
participants were asked to describe the area they had just passed
as aptly as possible using a few keywords. Participants who
volunteered to mention only the signboard or its message, were
encouraged to disclose more details, if possible. Participants
who failed to mention both the signboard or its message
were asked if they had passed a sign on the pavement and, if
answering confirmative, to tell the observer more about this
sign (including what had been on it). Participants who stated
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there had not been a sign were invited to turn around and
face the signboard, for the purpose of recognition. If they still
did not volunteer the message on the signboard they were
informed about it. These recall and recognition question(s)
finalized the interview. The total interview duration was
kept as short as possible, approximately 2 min. For the recall
questions, the observer pointed in the opposite direction of
the signboard (which coincided with participants’ walking
direction). She requested participants to look in the same
direction while describing the area they had just passed through.
The observer pointed as it prevented participants from looking
over their shoulder and face the signboard, as the pilot study
had shown. The interviews took place at least 4.5 m after passing
the signboard such that pedestrians’ backs remained to the
signboard. After finalizing the interview, participants received a
short debriefing.
The observers were trained and worked in pairs. Observations
took place from February 26 till April 25, 2018, during
weekdays and weekends during various times of day, weather
permitting. This, to ensure a mix of pedestrians familiar and
unfamiliar with the area.
Measures
Participants’ awareness of the signboard was assessed by their
ability to physically avoid the signboard (i.e., a behavioral
response) and their ability to recall or recognize its presence (i.e.,
a cognitive response). Hence, attempting to grasp both “acting
without awareness” as well as different degrees of awareness.
The behavioral response to the signboard consisted of (a)
avoiding bumping into the signboard, and (b) at what point
participants moved to avoid the signboard. Moving behavior was
measured by using the markers on the kerb and is defined as “very
early” (5–10 m before the signboard); “early” (1.5–5 m before the
signboard); and “late” (0–1.5 m before the signboard).
The cognitive response to the signboard was measured by
recall, and if necessary, recognition. This distinction was made to
increase exhaustiveness of our measure of degrees of awareness.
Recall consisted of mentioning the signboard and its text as part
of the thought samples, as part of the description of the area
or as part of the answer whether they had passed a sign on the
pavement and if so, what had been visible on the sign. Recall
of the text needed to include at least the Dutch equivalent of
the words “Welcome” and “St.-Jacobsstreet.” Recognition only
concerned participants who had previously stated there had not
been a sign (while facing away from the signboard). To aid
them, they viewed the blank backside of the signboard they
had just passed and – if not volunteered by then – were told
the message on the signboard. Both for recall and recognition
verbal responses were collected and participants’ reactions were
closely monitored for any signs of recognition or surprise. An
example of recognition was people’s ability to state the text on
the signboard after seeing its blank backside. Displays of surprise
included variations on exclamations such as “I really have not
seen that” and disbelief of having passed a sign without being
able to recall it.
Secondary task engagement and mind wandering were
measured. Mind wandering was derived from participants’
thought samples, similar to Burdett et al. (2018). Secondary
task engagement consisted of various overt secondary tasks.
They involved smoking; eating or drinking; talking to a fellow
pedestrian; listening to music using earbuds or headphones;
reading, typing or talking on their mobile phone or using their
phone for navigation; and, or, an activity not already listed. In
case no overt secondary tasks were observed this was confirmed
in the interview, similar to observations of overt secondary tasks.
The list of overt pedestrian activities was based on a pilot study.
Due to the nature of the study (being a naturalistic walking
study) walking companions influencing the walking behavior
of the “target pedestrian” toward the signboard has not been
controlled for. However, if the target pedestrian has become
aware of this guidance, it is expected to be measured as part of
the thought samples.
Route familiarity was assessed by using a 10-point scale on
which participants rated their familiarity with the area. The 10-
point scale was derived from Charlton and Starkey (2018b) and
ranged from 1, “this street is completely new to me, I have never
walked here before” to 10, “I know this street very well, I walk
here regularly.”
Participants
Since most walking is done along paths well-known it is
likely that route-unfamiliar participants might be undersampled.
Hence, based on an a priori power analysis, data sampling
continued until at least 44 participants rated themselves as very
unfamiliar with the particular street, scoring 1–3 on the route-
familiarity scale. The parameters for the power analysis (χ2,
Goodness-of-fit test) included a medium effect size (0.3), power
of 0.8 and α of 0.05.
For participation, the following inclusion criteria were held.
The observers did not include pedestrians who were under
18 years old by appearance; or walking with a pet or an object that
may influence (measurements of) avoidance behavior, such as a
walking cane or a pram; or who showed physical characteristics
indicative of severe motor impairment or visual impairment,
such as using a white cane. Visual ability has not been tested or
questioned, but it should be noted that none of the participants
reported he or she had been unable to read the text on the
signboard due to visual impairment. Participants who did not
have sufficient command of the Dutch language, were excluded
by the interviewer.
In total, 234 valid entries were collected out of 588 pedestrians
who were approached. Next to the 336 pedestrians who refrained
from participation an additional eighteen participants were
excluded from this study. These concerned participants who
reported they had seen the sign before, as well as participants
walking in pairs of which the person not closest to the signboard
insisted on participating (instead of the “target pedestrian”).
Participants were not paid for their participation.
To limit the amount of questions, participants’ gender had
been estimated. Both the observer as well as the interviewer
classified pedestrians as either male or female, to compute
participants’ gender-by-appearance. Agreement between the
interviewer and all four observers was almost perfect to perfect
(Landis and Koch, 1977), Kappa = 0.96 (p < 0.001); Kappa = 1.0
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(p< 0.001); Kappa = 1.0 (p< 0.001); and Kappa = 1.0 (p< 0.001),
consecutively. Due to the restricted interview time, participants’
age has not been recorded. To ensure a broad mix of participants
characteristics (e.g., familiarity as well as age), data sampling took
place during various days and times of the week, in an area
that is easily accessible by foot as well as by public transport,
car or bicycle, before venturing into the pedestrian areas of
the city centre. Hence, amongst the 234 entries were people of
various ages, ranging from adolescents (of at least 18 years old by
appearance) to middle-aged and elderly people.
Of the 234 pedestrians who participated in this study
56.4% were identified as “route familiar” and 18.8% as “route
unfamiliar,” scoring, respectively, 8–10 and 1–3 on the route-
familiarity scale. Observers classified 53.0% as male, 44.9% as
female and 2.1% as gender unknown or data missing. Of all,
65.8% participants walked alone, 30.3% walked in a pair and 3.8%
walked in a group of three or more people.
Data Analysis Method
Awareness
Participants behavioral and cognitive reactions toward the
signboard have been merged to define four distinct levels of
awareness: (1) full awareness, the highest level of awareness at
which participants displayed a rich conscious experience and
representation of the signboard, consistent with their ability to
avoid and recall it (for the latter, the results of the thought
samples, the descriptions of the surroundings they had just passed
and, if necessary, the straightforward question whether one had
passed a signboard on the pavement, were tallied to establish
recall of the signboard); (2) partial awareness, to account for
degraded conscious experiences and representations, based on
participants’ ability to avoid the signboard and to eventually
recognize it after failing recall; (3) acting without awareness, a
level at which participants were unable to report passing the
signboard while having managed to evade it; (4) no awareness, no
acting, a level at which participants bumped into the signboard.
Secondary Task Engagement
In case participants were engaged in multiple overt secondary
tasks, they were categorized under the most cognitively
demanding task. For example, being engaged in texting
while smoking was categorized as texting and being
engaged in listening to music while eating was categorized
as listening to music.
Mind Wandering
People’s thought samples were categorized using Burdett’s five-
way categorization of thoughts while driving (Burdett et al.,
2018). Categorization was done by answering three consecutive
questions. Firstly, is the participant thinking of something?
Secondly, is the thought related to the current journey the
pedestrian is undertaking? As walking is frequently part of a
multi-modal journey (Sauter et al., 2016), this included thoughts
related to other modalities as part of the current journey.
Thirdly, does the thought concern sensory information from the
walking environment? This included thoughts that appeared to
be triggered by information present that could be seen, heard,
felt, or smelt. Samples were categorized according to the first
component of participants’ response.
As a result of these questions, thought samples were coded into
one of five categories (see Table 1). Thought samples that did not
reflect any active thought at all would be labeled as “passive stand-
by mode” (category 5).
The third and fourth category consisted of all thoughts
associated with the walk and, or, the current journey pedestrians
were undertaking. These are regarded as task-related thoughts.
These categories differentiated according to whether the thought
samples directly concerned sensory information from the
walking environment (category 4) or whether they appeared to
be internally triggered (category 3). Category 3 included thoughts
about (the route to) the destination or being in time to catch the
next mode of transport. The on-task sensory thoughts coded into
category 4 also included thinking about the signboard.
Similarly, the second and first category could also be
coded as originating internally or externally. These thought
samples concerned active thoughts which suggested that the
participant’s mind was engaged in task-unrelated thought, also
regarded as mind wandering. Category 1 involved thoughts
coded as internally triggered mind wandering, such as thoughts
about work or food. Whilst category 2 concerned sensory
triggered thoughts that reflected mind wandering. This included
thoughts about shop windows which have just been passed and
information retrieved by smartphone screens.
A random sample of 20% of all cases was categorized
separately by two researchers with substantial agreement (Landis
and Koch, 1977), Kappa = 0.65 (p< 0.001).
TABLE 1 | Five-way categorization of pedestrians’ thoughts, adapted
from Burdett et al. (2018).











(2) Mind wandering: sensory (4) Walking/current journey:
sensory
Passive: thinking about nothing in particular
(5) Passive stand-by
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Effect Sizes
To calculate effect sizes, Cramer’s V, Spearman rho (ρ), Kendall’s
tau-c and Cohen’s d have been used. Following Cohen (1992), in
the current paper, the effect sizes have been classified as follows:
for Cohen’s d, a d of 0.20 represents a small effect size, a d of 0.50
represents a medium effect size, and a d of 0.80 represents a large
effect size. For the other measures, 0.10 has been interpreted as
a small effect size, 0.30 as a medium effect size, and 0.50 as a
large effect size.
RESULTS
Awareness of the Signboard
None of the participants walked into the signboard. Instead,
all of them moved to avoid it. Of them, 32.9% mentioned the
signboard and its text in recall (see Figure 2). These participants
were regarded to be fully aware of the signboard. A binomial
test showed this percentage is less than recalling the signboard
by chance, p < 0.001. An additional 13.2% – who initially
indicated there had not been a signboard present – were able
to recognize the signboard and its text after turning around
to see the signboard’s blank backside. They were either able
to (partially) report the text on the signboard after seeing its
blank backside, or showed clear signs of recognition after hearing
what was written on the signboard. Hence, they were labeled
as partially aware. Examples of partial awareness were “yes,
I do remember seeing that, as I then knew where I was” or
“I remember, as my grandson has the same name” (his name
is Jacob). When recognition and recall are tallied, 46.2% of
the participants were able to report on the signboard. This is
not significantly different from the probability of participants
reporting the signboard by chance (p = 0.266, with a binomial
test). The remaining 53.8% indicated that – even after looking
at the signboard’s back – they had not seen the signboard
before. These participants were considered to have been acting
without awareness. All of them showed signs of surprise (such
as exclaiming “I really have not seen that”), disbelief or
even discomfort of having passed a sign without being able
to recall it. Some participants tried to reduce this cognitive
dissonance by creating storylines explaining why they had not
seen the signboard. An example of this is the participant who
(inaccurately!) recalled not having passed the signboard as he had
just crossed the street.
Most participants moved to avoid the signboard between 5
and 1.5 m (42.7%) or 1.5 and 0 m (40.6%) before the signboard.
The remaining 16.7% moved between 10 and 5 m in advance.
No statistically significant difference nor correlation was found
between the previously defined levels of awareness and the
moment participants moved to avoid the signboard (χ2 = 0.719,
df = 2, p = 0.698, and ρ = −0.042, p = 0.520, respectively). Hence,
effect size was negligible. A statistical relation or difference
between the moment of moving and recall – the measure used
by Hyman et al. (2014) and referred to as full awareness in the
current paper – could not be found either (Cramer’s V = 0.070,
p = 0.568, and χ2 = 1.131, df = 2, p = 0.568, respectively).
Overt Secondary Task Engagement
Of all participants, 28.2% were engaged in talking with their
walking companion; 11.5% operated their mobile phone (for
calling, texting, reading or navigation, and any other dual-
activities which involved operating the mobile phone); 8.5%
listened to music through headphones (possibly while smoking,
eating or drinking at the same time); and 3.0% were only involved
in smoking, eating, or drinking while walking. As the number of
participants engaged in smoking, eating or drinking only was very
low (n = 7), they were excluded from further statistical analysis on
secondary task engagement. The remaining 48.7% did not display
any visible secondary tasks.
Participants’ level of awareness did not differ between the
various overt secondary tasks in which they were engaged and
effect size was small (χ2 = 4.654, df = 3, p = 0.199; Cramer’s
FIGURE 2 | Level of awareness for the signboard, based on walking behavior (avoidance of the signboard) and ability to report the signboard during recall or
recognition. The amount of participants being fully aware of the signboard is significantly lower than recalling the signboard by chance (p < 0.001), while tallying full
and partial awareness did not differ from chance level at all (p = 0.266).
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V = 0.183). However, full awareness does vary significantly
between various overt secondary tasks, χ2 = 10.060, df = 3,
p = 0.018. Figure 3 shows that in comparison to not performing a
visible secondary task, full awareness is lower for more cognitively
demanding tasks (such as talking with a companion or using
a mobile phone). While it is higher for overt secondary tasks
which require little to no attention. Though effect size was
small, Cramer’s V = 0.211. However, when regarding awareness
in total – tallying full and partial awareness – differences
between engaging or not engaging in any overt secondary
task disappeared (χ2 = 2.322, df = 3, p = 0.508; effect size:
Cramer’s V = 0.101).
The moment participants moved to avoid the signboard
differed significantly between the overt tasks in which they were
engaged (χ2 = 19.321, df = 6, p = 0.004). Figure 4 shows that
those involved in talking with their walking companion are most
likely to divert late from their original path (51.5%), while those
engaged in mobile phone use – an attention-demanding activity –
are least likely to do so (25.9%). Moreover, together with those
not engaged in any visible secondary tasks, those involved in
mobile phone use are most likely to divert very early from their
original path (within 10 – 5 m before the signboard), 25.4 and
18.5%, respectively. However, the effect size is small, Cramer’s
V = 0.206. The moment of moving to avoid the signboard is also
correlated with walking together or alone (Cramer’s V = 0.287,
p < 0.001). A multinomial logistic regression to control for the
number of walkers could not be performed as the assumption of
multicollinearity was violated; there was a very strong correlation
between walking with one or more people and overt secondary
task engagement, Cramer’s V = 0.872, p < 0.001. After removing
talking – which is the main overt secondary task for those
walking together – from the analysis, the Pearson Chi-Square
test was conducted again. The strong difference regarding the
moment participants moved to avoid the signboard and the overt
tasks in which they were engaged had now largely disappeared,
χ2 = 8.674, df = 4, p = 0.070. Effect size was smaller too,
Cramer’s V = 0.164.
Mind Wandering
Half of the participants reported thoughts not associated with
the current journey they were undertaking. These thoughts
were either internally triggered (32.9%, category 1) or sensory
triggered (18.4%, category 2). For 19.7% of the participants,
their thought sample was categorized as sensory triggered and
related to the current journey (category 4). This included
all accounts the signboard being mentioned as part of the
thought sample. Another 20.1% of the participants were also
thinking journey-related thoughts, though internally triggered
(category 3). The remaining 9.0% reported not thinking about
anything in particular. As such, they qualified as passive
stand-by (category 5).
Figure 5 shows that participants’ level of awareness differed
significantly between the five thought categories (χ2 = 11.674,
df = 4, p = 0.020; Cramer’s V = 0.187). Though the effect
size is small. Pearson Chi-Square tests revealed the differences
were significant both for full awareness vs. the lack thereof,
as well as for awareness altogether (combining full and partial
awareness) vs. acting without awareness, χ2 = 9.853, df = 4,
p = 0.043 and χ2 = 11.618, df = 4, p = 0.020, respectively.
Unsurprisingly, participants with an external attentional focus on
FIGURE 3 | Participants’ level of awareness for the signboard while being engaged in various overt secondary tasks. Engagement in any overt secondary task (or
the lack thereof) differed significantly for full awareness (p = 0.018). When tallying full and partial awareness these differences disappeared (p = 0.508).
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FIGURE 4 | The moment participants move to avoid the signboard differed significantly between the various overt secondary tasks (p = 0.004). When excluding
talking – which is the main overt secondary task for those walking together – this difference largely disappeared (p = 0.070).
FIGURE 5 | Distribution of participants’ level of awareness for the signboard for each of the five categories of pedestrians’ thoughts (as described in Table 1).
Pedestrians’ thoughts differed significantly both for those fully aware (p = 0.043) as well as for the combination of those fully or partially aware of the signboard
(p = 0.020).
walking (category 4) were most likely to report the signboard’s
presence. Moreover, it appears that maintaining an external focus
in general, even when not dedicated to the task of walking, may
aid one’s ability to become aware of the signboard obstructing
the path. This, in comparison with internally triggered thoughts,
χ2 = 5.784, df = 1, p = 0.016. Though effect size is small,
Cohen’s d = 0.23. Additionally, thoughts of the wandering mind
were compared with thoughts focused on walking/the current
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journey (categories 3 and 4) and having no thoughts at all
(category 5). This revealed that the mind being occupied with
task-unrelated thoughts does not necessarily translate into a
decreased likelihood of awareness for the signboard (χ2 = 0.788,
df = 1, p = 0.375; effect size, Cohen’s d = 0.12).
The moment participants moved to avoid the signboard
did not differ significantly between the five thought categories
(χ2 = 8.161, df = 8, p = 0.418, with only small effect size, Cramer’s
V = 0.132). Contrary to overt secondary task engagement,
the five-way categorization of thoughts while walking was not
correlated with walking together or alone (Cramer’s V = 0.139,
p = 0.337). Hence, there was no need to control for the number
of walkers in relation to the moment participants moved to
avoid the signboard.
Route Familiarity
Unsurprisingly, most participants were very familiar with the
street. Many volunteered they either lived or worked near the
FIGURE 6 | Distribution of self-reported route familiarity.
FIGURE 7 | Amount of participants for each level of awareness of the signboard and average route familiarity, for participants walking alone or together (with two or
more people). It is significantly more likely that one is partially aware of the signboard rather than fully aware, when walking together compared to walking alone
(p = 0.013). Additionally, pedestrians who were walking together, with two or more people, were significantly more likely to be unfamiliar with the street (p = 0.001).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 August 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1846
fpsyg-10-01846 August 10, 2019 Time: 11:30 # 10
Harms et al. Walking Without Awareness
research location. As a result, route familiarity was not evenly
distributed amongst the participants (see Figure 6).
When calculating the effect of route familiarity on awareness,
the number of people walking together was taken into account.
This was done, as it has already been established that full
awareness decreased when talking with a walking companion.
Additionally, pedestrians who were walking together, with two
or more people, were more likely to be unfamiliar with the
street, as shown in Figure 7 (Cramer’s V = 0.356, p = 0.001).
Though the relation exists, it is not very strong. To control
for this effect, a multinomial logistic regression was performed.
This revealed that it is indeed more likely that one is partially
aware of the signboard rather than fully aware when walking
together compared to walking alone [p = 0.013, 95% CI (0.124,
0.782)]. No effect of route familiarity on awareness of the
signboard could be found.
No statistically significant difference was found between route
familiarity and the moment participants moved to avoid the
signboard (χ2 = 8.462, df = 9, p = 0.488; effect size, Kendall’s
tau-c = −0.078). This finding was confirmed with multinomial
logistic regression, controlling for the number of walkers. In
addition, this test revealed that pedestrians who were walking
alone – instead of together, so with two or more people – were
more likely to divert their walking trajectory (very) early rather
than late, p = 0.015, 95% CI [1.166, 4.069] and p< 0.001, 95% CI
[2.883, 29.370], respectively.
Self-reported route familiarity had a significant effect on overt
secondary task engagement, Cramer’s V = 0.233, p = 0.050.
However, this effect could entirely be attributed to talking. When
excluding talking – the main overt secondary task of those
walking together – the effect disappeared, Cramer’s V = 0.242,
p = 0.332. Since there is also a very strong correlation between
walking with one or more people and overt secondary task
engagement, Cramer’s V = 0.872, p < 0.001, a multinomial
logistic regression was performed to control for the number of
people walking. This analysis revealed no significant effect of
either self-reported route familiarity or the number of walkers on
overt secondary task engagement.
Contrary to overt secondary task engagement, the five-way
categorization of thoughts while walking was not correlated with
self-reported route familiarity, Cramer’s V = 0.150, p = 0.979. For
this analysis, the number of walkers was not controlled for as it
was previously established that this variable was not correlated
with the five-way categorization of thoughts.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Although more than half of the participants (53.8%) were
unaware of the signboard, the absence of awareness does not
imply any absence of cognitive and perceptual processing. On
contrary, none of the participants had bumped into the signboard
which means that the signboard’s presence has indeed been
sufficiently processed to enable the participants to successfully
negotiate the obstacle. Thus, awareness is not a prerequisite to
avoid obstacles. What is more, the lack of a verbal report to
confirm an object’s presence does not mean that the object has
not been taken into account. Similar to Fisher (1992) and Harms
et al. (2018), the current study provides further evidence that
objects may indeed guide someone’s behavior without this person
becoming aware of said objects. It appears that in traffic, one can
act without awareness, and regardless of mode of transport. For
driving, the act of driving without awareness has already been
documented by Charlton and Starkey (2011). The current study
shows it is a very common cognitive mode for walking as well.
The finding that many pedestrians appear to “walk without
awareness” bears strong similarities with a phenomenon called
blindsight, which is the ability of people who are cortically
blind in a part of their visual field – due to damage to primary
visual cortex – to visually process stimuli appearing in that
field without becoming aware of these stimuli. This residual
vision depends on secondary visual pathways and can be used
for visuomotor control (Danckert and Goodale, 2000; Danckert
and Rossetti, 2005). Adapting from this, the use of secondary
visual pathways to interpret their surroundings may provide a
possible explanation for the healthy participants unaware of the
signboard in the current study; enabling them to effectively avoid
the obstacle without becoming aware of it. This is relevant, as in
laboratory studies obstacle avoidance is often investigated with
participants aware of the obstacle (Higuchi, 2013). It is possible
that different neural circuits could be involved in the control of
obstacle avoidance with and without awareness.
Despite prior expectations, route familiarity did not affect
awareness or avoidance behavior, nor did it relate to overt
secondary task engagement, or mind wandering. This may
suggest that – contrary to driving – walking is in fact so
ubiquitous that route familiarity does not facilitate further
automaticity. Instead, walking is already executed as a largely,
and highly automated procedure requiring very little to no
attention. Although age-related differences may apply (Higuchi,
2013). Another explanation might be that – within a country –
walking environments such as city centre pavements might be
less diverse compared to driving environments. Though further
research is needed to fully understand diversity in walking
environments. Another factor is that in general people will have
at least 18 years more experience with walking than with driving
(depending on the age one may obtain their driving license).
The idea of regarding walking as a highly automated procedure
is further corroborated by (a) the notice that while walking
51.3% of the participants were engaged in overt secondary
tasks, and (b) the fact that half of the participants (51.3%)
were mind wandering. The overt secondary tasks included more
cognitively demanding tasks such as talking, which increased the
likelihood of degraded rather than full awareness. Nevertheless,
these secondary tasks did not affect awareness as such nor
avoidance behavior. Although the mind was occupied with
task-unrelated thoughts it did not seem to translate into a
decreased likelihood of awareness for the signboard, nor did
it affect avoidance behavior. Smallwood and Schooler (2015)
have pointed out that it is indeed possible that mind wandering
does not deteriorate the task at hand when performance of that
task is automated.
Additionally, the current study provides further evidence for
the notion of a disengagement between body and mind when
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 August 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1846
fpsyg-10-01846 August 10, 2019 Time: 11:30 # 11
Harms et al. Walking Without Awareness
walking, also identified by Middleton (2009) and Wunderlich
(2008). This allows the body to walk, while an automated
monitoring process is used to scan the environment for
obstacles and other hazards. As such, most objects may be
handled without given much thought, reminiscent of the tandem
model proposed by Charlton and Starkey (2011, 2013) when
describing driving without awareness. Or as Rasmussen (1983,
p. 259) puts it, at skill-based level ‘the total performance is
smooth and integrated, and sense input is not selected or
observed: the senses are only directed toward the aspects of
the environment needed subconsciously to update and orient
the internal map. The man looks rather than sees’. At the
same time, the mind can be occupied with other, higher order,
and cognitive functions. Hence, attention can be allocated to
mind wandering and, or, performing overt secondary tasks such
as talking and mobile phone use. That we could not find a
statistically significant difference between the (cognitive) levels
of awareness and the (bodily) moment participants moved to
avoid the signboard provides further evidence for the notion of
a bodily disengagement. We argue this dual operating mode is
possible because walking consists of highly skilled performance.
The robustness of this bodily disengagement can be anecdotally
emphasized by the gentleman who moved so late that he had to
swing his hip to the side and lift his arm over the signboard in
order to avoid it. Yet, he failed to show even the faintest sign of
recognition of the signboard.
One of the main differences between the current study and
the study performed by Hyman et al. (2014) is that Hyman
found a significant difference between full awareness and the
moment participants moved to avoid the signboard. They found
that those diverting late for the signboard were less likely to
be fully aware of the signboard. Possibly this can be explained
by it being rather rare to divert late at their campus site
(14.9%). While in the city centre, the location used in the
current study, it was rather common to divert late (40.6%).
Similarly to our results, Hyman et al. (2014) also found that
participants engaged with their mobile phone were less likely
to be fully aware of the signboard. In addition, we found this
also to be the case for talking with a walking companion.
However, when taking into account degraded awareness as
well next to full awareness, this effect was gone. This suggests
that when measuring awareness, it is important not only to
focus on recall. The current study displayed the difference
between full and partial awareness in a real-life situation,
hence confirming that awareness comes in degrees and that
awareness can be degraded. Including recognition enables the
measurement of more degraded experiences and representations,
that might not be touched upon when only considering recall
(Overgaard and Sandberg, 2012). Including recognition and
therefore providing the participants with the opportunity to
view the actual signboard (backside) and to be told what
text it displayed, is also likely to prevent the findings in
this study to be attributed to memory loss rather than the
lack of awareness.
A critical note concerns the use of the rating scale of familiarity
with the street. It appeared that despite the anchors of the scale
reflecting the frequency of visits to the street, the subjective
ratings of familiarity did not necessarily do the same. Participants
appeared much inclined to rate themselves a five or higher, while
this did not necessarily match the frequency with which they had
visited the street. An example of this was given by participant 346,
who stated “I have been here for the 4th time, so I rate myself
a 5.” Other examples were participants who rated themselves a
4, or a 6, respectively, and subsequently told the observer they
were lost (p. 546) or searching the right route (p. 257). On
average, participants who rated themselves as 1 – 3 volunteered
they were in the street for the first or second time. Those who
rated themselves as 8 – 10 often remarked they lived or worked
in, or nearby, the targeted street. As such, the relation between
subjective ratings of familiarity and the actual frequency of visits
to the street is likely to be skewed.
In conclusion, despite being very common there was no
evidence that walking without awareness necessarily results
in risk. Walking is such a well-rehearsed, universal mode of
transport that it can be performed largely automatically to the
point that one can even avoid obstacles on a city centre pavement
with little to no awareness of them. Thus, the question rises
whether it is necessary or even feasible to request pedestrians
to be constantly paying attention when walking, which is still
common practice in various road safety campaigns.
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